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NOTE
CORPORATIONS-MEmBERSHIP CORPORATION MAY SUE AS "CITIZEN" TO HAVE VIOLATiON
OF CONSTrrUIONAL PROviSION ENjonaD.-The Court of Appeals in a unanimous
decision affirmed an order of the Appellate Division granting a membership corpora-
tion the right to institute suit as a "citizen.' 1
Plaintiff, a membership corporation (defined by section 2 of the New York Mem-
bership Corporation Law as "a corporation not organized for pecuniary profit"), in-
stituted suit to restrain the New York State Conservation Commissioner from letting
contracts for the cutting down and clearing away of timber in the State Forest Reserve.
The theory of the suit was that the statute giving the Commission the power to let
such contracts2 is unconstitutional, in that it violates article XIV, § 1 of the
State Constitution, which provides that the Forest Preserve be kept forever wild.
Section 4 of the same article gives any "citizen" the right to institute suit to en-
join a violation of § 1.
The Commissioner took the position that the plaintiff had no capacity to institute
suit, on the theory that a membership corporation is not a "citizen". He cited two
cases3 in support of his position, both of which involved constructions of the Privi-
leges and Immunities clause of the United States Constitution,4 to the effect that a
corporation is not a citizen of the United States and as such "entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states. '5 However, for jurisdic-
tional purposes a corporation is considered to be a citizen of the State under the laws
of which it was created; article III, § 2 of the Federal Constitution confers jurisdiction
on the federal courts in cases where there is diversity of citizenship between the
parties.6
To what extent do the courts treat as legal reality the fictitious corporate en-
tity? To what degree is the corporate personality sun furis?
"It is called the body corporate," said Lord Coke, "because the persons composing
it are made into one body.. . . It is only in abstracto, and rests only in contempla-
tion of law."
7
In the United States the corporate entity was held in the early case of Bank
of the United States v. Deveauxs to be "certainly not a citizen; and consequently it
cannot sue or be sued in the courts of the United States.... ."9 In the leading Dart-
mouth College case,1 0 the Court asserted that the body corporate is an artificial legal
1 Matter of Oneida County Forest Preserve Council v. Wehle, 309 N. Y. 152,
128 N. E. 2d 282 (1955).
2 L. 1955, c. 224.
3 Fire Dep't of City of New York v. Stanton, 28 App. Div. 334, 51 N. Y. S. 242
(1st Dept. 1898); Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 169 N. Y.
506, 62 N. E. 587 (1902).
4 U. S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537, 48 S. Ct. 577, 72
L. Ed. 978 (1928).
5 U. S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; Selovar, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U. S. 112,
33 S. Ct. 69, 57 L. Ed. 146 (1912).
6 Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U. S. 579, 25 S. Ct. 355, 49 L. Ed. 606 (1905);
Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U. S. 561, 32 S. Ct. 704, 56 L. Ed. 1205 (1912); Salem
Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182, 44 S. Ct. 266, 68 L. Ed. 628
(1924); 13 Am. JuR. Corporations, § 12, 13, 14 (1955).
7 Quoted in Warner & Ray v. Beers, 23 Wend. 103 (1840).
8 Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 3 L. Ed. 38 (1809).
9 Id. at 86, 3 L. Ed. 38, 44.
10 Dartmouth College v. Woodard, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819).
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person, a succession of individuals, or an aggregate body considered by the law as a
single continuous person, "limited to one peculiar mode of action, and having power
only of the kind and degree prescribed by the law which confers them."
1 1
Thus, although the courts were reluctant at this early stage to find the power to
litigate implicit in the corporation's charter, or to recognize it as a capable party in
contemplation of law, thus enabling it to sue and be sued, the courts nevertheless
were explicit in attributing, for other purposes, a legal personality to the corporation.
The Deveaux case12 was decided in 1809 by the highest tribunal of a 20-year-old
agrarian democracy. There was yet no American industry in the modern sense. The
business corporation had not yet begun to have the economic and social impact on
the community which it was later to have while developing and channelling the wealth
created by the industrial revolution. Contemporaneous with this increase in corporate
influence and importance in the economy (and therefore in the community) came a
tendency toward allowing the corporation to appear as a party in the courts of the
United States; at first to only a limited and restricted degree, and later to the extent
of recognizing its "citizenship" for this single purpose.1 3 At the same time, corporate
influence in the state legislatures and courts achieved the same end.
1 4
However, the courts have generally maintained that a corporation is not a citizen
for other than these limited purposes.1 5 Obviously, corporations cannot vote, bold
office, or perform many of the other functions of the natural citizen of the United
States.
In the instant case, the Commissioner contended that, whatever right a private or
public corporation might have to sue as a "citizen" on a private cause of action
accruing to it, the membership corporation bringing suit in this case was not a juridi-
cal person who might appropriately champion constitutional rights in the courts.
However, the Court of Appeals felt that the plaintiff in this case could appro-
priately seek enforcement of a constitutional provision in the courts, in view of the
purpose of the association and the nature of the provision sought to be enforced. In
a New York case between parties who bore an analogous relationship, a membership
corporation obtained consent to institute suit under article VII, § 7 of the New York
State Constitution.' 6 The issue as to plaintiff's right to sue was never raised; but
although not determinative of the instant case, the former case can be viewed as illus-
trative of the membership corporation's right to champion its own cause and be re-
garded as a "juridical person".
The defendant further contended that this corporation had no justiciable interest
that made it an appropriate champion of constitutional principles. The cases cited
in support of this proposition, however, were not in point, for they merely held, on
11 Id. at 576, 4 L. Ed. 629, 644.
12 See note 8, supra.
13 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267, 2 L. Ed. 435 (1806); Louisville, C. & C.
R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 11 L. Ed. 353 (1844); Home Ins. Co. v. Morse,
20 Wall. 445, 22 L. Ed. 365 (1874); Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F. 2d
524 (1934); United States v. Northwestern Express Stage & Transp. Co., 164 U. S.
686, 17 S. Ct. 206, 51 L. Ed. 599 (1897); McKinley v. Wheeler, 130 U. S. 630,
9 S. Ct. 638, 32 L. Ed. 1048 (1889); Ramsey v. Tacoma Land Co., 196 U. S. 360,
25 S. Ct. 286, 49 L. Ed. 513 (1905).
14 Green, Corporations as Persons, Citizens and Possessors of Liberty, 94 U. PA. L.
REv. 202 (1945).
15 See cases in notes 3 and 4, supra.
16 Association for Protection of Adirondacks v. McDonald, 253 N. Y. 234, 170
N. E. 902 (1930).
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the particular facts in each case, that the particular corporations involved had no
justiciable interest in the controversy.
1 7
judge Burke, writing for the Court, summed up by noting the judicial trend toward
a more liberal attitude in permitting associations or corporations to champion consti-
tutional rights.'8 This case, by extending to a membership corporation the right (which
the New York Constitution gives only to "citizens") to sue to enjoin a violation of a
constitutional provision, seems to illustrate a logical progression of the trend in New
York.
17 Associated Painting Employers of Brooklyn v. Kessler, 257 App. Div. 986,
13 N. Y. S. 2d 631 (2nd Dept. 1939); United Cloak & Suit Designers Mut. Aid
Ass'n v. Sigman, 218 App. Div. 367, 218 N. Y. S. 483 (1st Dept. 1926); Matter of
New York State Licensed Bail Agents Ass'n v. Murtagh, 279 App. Div. 851, aff'd
303 N. Y. 1009, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 154 (1st Dept. 1952).
18 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070
(1925); Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 91 S. Ct. 624, 95 L. Ed. 817
(1951).
